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Budgetary Decision Making by Executive and Legislative Budget Analysts: The Impact of Political Cues and Analytical Information
Author(s) -
Goodman Doug,
Clynch Edward J.
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
public budgeting and finance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.694
H-Index - 30
eISSN - 1540-5850
pISSN - 0275-1100
DOI - 10.1111/j.0275-1100.2004.02403002.x
Subject(s) - legislature , rationality , politics , accounting , business , executive summary , executive information system , empirical evidence , public economics , economics , political science , finance , information system , management information systems , philosophy , epistemology , law
We explore the extent to which attributes of individual analysts and institutional factors lead to budgetary decisions based on political cues and/or analytical information among executive and legislative budget analysts. We surveyed executive and legislative budget analysts in 13 western states to ascertain the factors that influence their budgetary decisions. The findings build on evidence from previous studies that confirms the complexity of factors affecting budget analysts' decisions, and they provide empirical support to analysts' use of a combination of information labeled “budget rationality” by Thurmaier and Willoughby. Also, we provide more conclusive evidence that both executive and legislative analysts follow similar decision‐making patterns.