Premium
Learning to Think: A Response to the Language of Thought Argument for Innateness
Author(s) -
Viger Christopher
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00287.x
Subject(s) - argument (complex analysis) , natural language , natural (archaeology) , meaning (existential) , cognitive science , representation (politics) , epistemology , logical form , linguistics , computer science , philosophy , psychology , biochemistry , chemistry , archaeology , politics , political science , law , history
Jerry Fodor's argument for an innate language of thought continues to be a hurdle for researchers arguing that natural languages provide us with richer conceptual systems than our innate cognitive resources. I argue that because the logical/formal terms of natural languages are given a use‐theory of meaning, unlike predicates, logical/formal terms might be learned without a mediating internal representation. In that case, our innate representational system might have less logical structure than a natural language, making it possible that we augment our innate representational system and improve our ability to think by learning a natural language.