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Context‐Sensitive Truth‐Theoretic Accounts of Semantic Competence
Author(s) -
Gross Steven
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00278.x
Subject(s) - utterance , semantic theory of truth , truth value , competence (human resources) , epistemology , linguistics , cognition , truth condition , coherence theory of truth , cognitive science , psychology , philosophy of language , linguistic competence , pragmatic theory of truth , cognitive psychology , computer science , philosophy , social psychology , metaphysics , neuroscience
According to cognitivist truth‐theoretic accounts of semantic competence, aspects of our linguistic behavior can be explained by ascribing to speakers cognition of truth‐theories. It's generally assumed on this approach that, however much context‐sensitivity speakers’ languages contain, the cognized truth‐theories themselves can be adequately characterized context‐ in sensitively—that is, without using in the meta‐language expressions whose semantic value can vary across occasions of utterance. In this paper, I explore some of the motivations for and problems and consequences of dropping this assumption.