Cohen and Kinds: A Response to Nathan Nobis

In a recent article in the Journal of Applied Philosophy, Nathan Nobis outlines an argument against Carl Cohen’s influential defence of speciesism which, if successful, would be devastating [1]. This debate is of more than parochial interest, because the strategy Cohen employs to demarcate the class of beings with moral rights is widely utilized by opponents of abortion as well; it is not only our attitudes to non-human animals which are at stake, but also the morality of our treatment of the biologically human. I suspect that, as it stands at least, Nobis’s argument does not succeed: those who want to elevate the biologically human over the non-human have available plausible replies to his arguments. This is an exercise in devil’s advocacy: I am myself a supporter of fairly free access to abortions, and better treatment of non-human animals. However, just because I am committed to these views, I want to ensure that the arguments for them are the strongest they can possibly be. I offer this in that spirit, as a step toward strengthening these views by testing them against objections.