Premium
Divisor Methods for Sequential Portfolio Allocation in Multi‐Party Executive Bodies: Evidence from Northern Ireland and Denmark
Author(s) -
O'Leary Brendan,
Grofman Bernard,
Elklit Jørgen
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
american journal of political science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 6.347
H-Index - 170
eISSN - 1540-5907
pISSN - 0092-5853
DOI - 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2005.00118.x
Subject(s) - parliament , cabinet (room) , northern ireland , danish , political science , representation (politics) , public administration , operations research , law , sociology , geography , mathematics , ethnology , politics , linguistics , philosophy , archaeology
Some proportional representation (PR) rules can also be used to specify the sequence in which each party in a parliament or each member in a multiparty governing coalition is given its choice about (unique) desired resources, e.g., “indivisible goods” such as cabinet ministries or executive positions, thus providing an algorithmic method for determining “fair” allocations. Divisor rule sequencing using the d'Hondt method was recently used to determine the ten cabinet positions in the Northern Ireland Executive Committee created under the 1998 Belfast (“Good Friday”) Agreement; and such sequential allocation procedures have been used in some Danish municipal governments, and for determination of committee chairs in the European parliament. Here we examine in some detail the procedures used in Northern Ireland and Denmark, with a focus on special features such as the option in Denmark to form post‐election alliances.