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Policing the Bargain: Coalition Government and Parliamentary Scrutiny
Author(s) -
Martin Lanny W.,
Vanberg Georg
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
american journal of political science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 6.347
H-Index - 170
eISSN - 1540-5907
pISSN - 0092-5853
DOI - 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00053.x
Subject(s) - cabinet (room) , scrutiny , delegate , delegation , argument (complex analysis) , political science , government (linguistics) , raising (metalworking) , public administration , coalition government , principal (computer security) , law and economics , multi party system , political economy , economics , law , democracy , politics , computer security , biochemistry , chemistry , linguistics , philosophy , geometry , mathematics , archaeology , computer science , history , programming language
Policymaking by coalition governments creates a classic principal‐agent problem. Coalitions are comprised of parties with divergent preferences who are forced to delegate important policymaking powers to individual cabinet ministers, thus raising the possibility that ministers will attempt to pursue policies favored by their own party at the expense of their coalition partners. What is going to keep ministers from attempting to move policy in directions they favor rather than sticking to the “coalition deal”? We argue that parties will make use of parliamentary scrutiny of “hostile” ministerial proposals to overcome the potential problems of delegation and enforce the coalition bargain. Statistical analysis of original data on government bills in Germany and the Netherlands supports this argument. Our findings suggest that parliaments play a central role in allowing multiparty governments to solve intracoalition conflicts .