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Interstate Competition and Environmental Regulation: A Test of the Race‐to‐the‐Bottom Thesis *
Author(s) -
Woods Neal D.
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
social science quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.482
H-Index - 90
eISSN - 1540-6237
pISSN - 0038-4941
DOI - 10.1111/j.0038-4941.2006.00375.x
Subject(s) - competitor analysis , enforcement , competition (biology) , race to the bottom , state (computer science) , race (biology) , race to the top , test (biology) , environmental regulation , business , public economics , economics , political science , microeconomics , ecology , market economy , marketing , globalization , law , sociology , gender studies , algorithm , computer science , biology , incentive
Objective. This study assesses the effect of interstate competition on the stringency with which states enforce environmental regulations. Method. Pooled cross‐sectional time‐series analysis of state surface‐mining regulation is used to determine if the enforcement gap between a state and competitor states affects the stringency of state enforcement. Results. The results suggest that state enforcement is systematically affected by the behavior of regional competitors. States adjust their enforcement in response to competitor states when their enforcement stringency exceeds that of their competitors. When competitors' enforcement is more stringent, however, their behavior does not have a significant effect. Conclusion. This study provides empirical evidence for a race to the bottom in state environmental regulation.