A Problem for a Direct‐Reference Theory of Belief Reports

The direct-reference theory of belief reports to which I allude is the one held by such theorists as Nathan Salmon, Scott Soames, and David Braun. Qua theorists of directreference semantics, these philosophers hold that: (1) The propositions we believe and say are Russellian propositions: structured propositions whose basic components are the objects and properties our thoughts and speech acts are about. (2) Many singular terms—e.g. pronouns, simple demonstratives, and names—typically function as directly-referential singular terms, where a token of a singular term is directly referential provided its only contribution to the proposition expressed is its referent. It is customary for direct-reference theorists to represent the content of a token of t is F as the Russellian singular proposition , where x is the referent of the token of the singular term t and Φ is the property expressed by the token of the predicate F. Necessarily, is true iff x instantiates Φ, false otherwise. Their theory of belief reports is defined by their also holding that: (3) A belief report of the form ‘A believes that S’ is true iff the referent of the substitution instance of ‘A’ stands in the belief relation—the two-place relation expressed by ‘believes’ in ‘A believes that S’—to the Russellian proposition to which the substitution instance of ‘that S’ refers. For example, ‘Lester believes that Fido is a dog’ is true just in case Lester stands in the belief relation to .