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A New Asymmetry Between Actions And Omissions*
Author(s) -
Sartorio Carolina
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
noûs
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.574
H-Index - 66
eISSN - 1468-0068
pISSN - 0029-4624
DOI - 10.1111/j.0029-4624.2005.00509.x
Subject(s) - citation , library science , computer science , south carolina , information retrieval , political science , public administration
In both cases, I couldn’t have prevented the ensuing death. However, intuitively, whereas I am morally responsible (‘‘responsible,’’ for short) for Victim’s death in Shooting, I am not responsible for the child’s death in Sharks. Shooting is a ‘‘Frankfurt-style’’ case. In a Frankfurt-style case, it has been argued, an agent is responsible for something that he couldn’t have prevented. Thus, in Shooting, I couldn’t have failed to kill Victim, but I am still responsible for his death. For I freely made the decision to shoot and I freely acted on that decision (the neuroscientist didn’t have to intervene). By contrast, in Sharks, I am not responsible for the child’s death. I freely decided to stay on the shore, and the sharks didn’t have to intervene, but, somehow, the fact that I couldn’t have saved the child given that the water