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Coherence and Conditionality in European Foreign Policy: Negotiating the EU–Mexico Global Agreement *
Author(s) -
SZYMANSKI MARCELA,
SMITH MICHAEL E.
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
jcms: journal of common market studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.54
H-Index - 90
eISSN - 1468-5965
pISSN - 0021-9886
DOI - 10.1111/j.0021-9886.2005.00551.x
Subject(s) - conditionality , negotiation , politics , political science , coherence (philosophical gambling strategy) , democracy , european union , commission , political economy , european commission , foreign policy , international trade , economic system , economics , law , physics , quantum mechanics
The EU–Mexico Global Agreement is one of the most comprehensive agreements ever made by the EU with a non‐European country, and the first pact that Mexico has ever accepted that conditions the relationship on respect for democracy and human rights. This article explains why the EU insisted on such political conditions in the agreement, and why Mexico ultimately accepted the EU's terms after initially refusing them. As the economic case is only moderately compelling, we focus instead on the Commission's unique capacity to manipulate key elements of the negotiation process. The article also highlights the growing importance of two principles governing the EU's external relations ‐ coherence and political conditionality – and how those principles might further expand the EU's global political influence.