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LACK‐OF‐RECALL AND CENTRALIZED MONETARY TRADE*
Author(s) -
Temzelides Ted,
Yu Jialin
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
international economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.658
H-Index - 86
eISSN - 1468-2354
pISSN - 0020-6598
DOI - 10.1111/j.0020-6598.2004.00303.x
Subject(s) - recall , anonymity , economics , welfare , microeconomics , monetary economics , psychology , computer science , cognitive psychology , computer security , market economy
We introduce lack‐of‐recall of past transactions as an alternative assumption to anonymity in a model where trade is centralized. In environments where there is an intertemporal lack‐of‐double‐coincidence of wants problem and lack‐of‐commitment, lack‐of‐recall can give rise to monetary equilibria that dominate nonmonetary outcomes in terms of welfare.