Premium
Reward Offered, No Questions Asked: An Analysis of Rewarded Theft
Author(s) -
Katz Eliakim,
Rosenberg Jacob
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
economica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.532
H-Index - 65
eISSN - 1468-0335
pISSN - 0013-0427
DOI - 10.1111/j.0013-0427.2004.00383.x
Subject(s) - ransom , negotiation , business , value (mathematics) , ex ante , law and economics , actuarial science , economics , law , political science , computer science , machine learning , macroeconomics
The legal owner of a stolen good generally puts a higher value on that good than does the thief. There are therefore potential gains from trade between a legal owner and a successful thief. However, by trading with a thief, the legal owner is encouraging theft for ‘ransom’. Should then negotiations between legal owners and thieves be outlawed? In this paper we suggest a framework for answering this question. We find that allowing such negotiations to take place may enhance the ex ante expected utility of owners.