Premium
Bribes in a Supply Line
Author(s) -
Sanyal Amal
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
economica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.532
H-Index - 65
eISSN - 1468-0335
pISSN - 0013-0427
DOI - 10.1111/j.0013-0427.2004.00362.x
Subject(s) - language change , competition (biology) , business , line (geometry) , industrial organization , economics , operations management , microeconomics , art , ecology , geometry , literature , mathematics , biology
The paper models the practice of charging bribes for faster delivery of essential services. It then examines the possibility of curbing corruption by supervision and by introducing competition among delivery agents. It is argued that a supervisory solution eludes the problem because no hard evidence of the reduction of corruption can be established for this type of offence. It is then shown that using more than one supplier reduces the bribe rate and the waiting period for both bribe‐payers and others; and the aggregate gain of consumers exceeds the cost of hiring additional suppliers.