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Minorities and majorities: a dynamic model of assimilation
Author(s) -
Kónya István
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
canadian journal of economics/revue canadienne d'économique
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1540-5982
pISSN - 0008-4085
DOI - 10.1111/j.0008-4085.2005.00331.x
Subject(s) - multiculturalism , assimilation (phonology) , melting pot , outcome (game theory) , ethnic group , population , minority group , path (computing) , econometrics , demographic economics , economics , computer science , mathematical economics , sociology , demography , political science , linguistics , law , philosophy , programming language
. The paper analyses the population dynamics of a country that has two ethnic groups, a minority and a majority, and minority members can choose to assimilate into the majority. Depending on the minority's size, the long‐run outcome can be full or no assimilation. Under certain parameter values multiple equilibria exist, including the two extreme cases. The paper demonstrates that both the long‐run outcome and the equilibrium path may be inefficient. Two extensions to the basic model are considered. The first one allows for a comparison between a multicultural and a ‘melting pot’ society. The second one introduces population growth and studies the interplay between exogenous and endogenous changes in the minority's size. JEL classification: J110, J150, J180