Premium
Using patents to mislead rivals
Author(s) -
Langinier Corinne
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
canadian journal of economics/revue canadienne d'économique
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1540-5982
pISSN - 0008-4085
DOI - 10.1111/j.0008-4085.2005.00291.x
Subject(s) - innovator , duopoly , incentive , private information retrieval , resolution (logic) , business , industrial organization , microeconomics , economics , marketing , entrepreneurship , cournot competition , computer science , finance , computer security , artificial intelligence
. Firms claim they do not rely heavily on patents. Yet they patent, as indicated by the large number of patents that are granted. This paper offers a possible resolution to this puzzle. It takes a simplified version of a duopoly innovation race and studies the patenting decision of an innovator who has private information about the improvability of her innovation. It is shown that a firm may use the patenting decision to mislead her rival. Under symmetric information, research can be stimulated but not disclosed. However, under asymmetric information, disclosure is more likely, even though research incentive may be weakened. JEL Classification: 031, L1