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Re‐connecting capitalism: prospects for the regulatory reform of the employee interest in UK takeovers
Author(s) -
Rees Chris,
Gold Michael
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
industrial relations journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.525
H-Index - 3
eISSN - 1468-2338
pISSN - 0019-8692
DOI - 10.1111/irj.12310
Subject(s) - capitalism , shareholder , politics , intermediary , state (computer science) , market economy , value (mathematics) , shareholder value , business , economics , political economy , law and economics , finance , corporate governance , political science , law , algorithm , machine learning , computer science
This article draws upon the disconnected capitalism thesis (DCT) to analyse UK takeovers and their implications for workers. The DCT refers to the disconnect between the source of value creation (the labour process) and the wider political economy. Specifically, we highlight a particular aspect of this disconnect whereby those who create value and have a long‐term stake in firms (employees and managers at the firm level) are disconnected from decisions regarding takeovers, as a consequence of wider economic and political trends (processes of financialisation/marketisation and associated state support for a neoliberal takeover regime). We outline these trends and argue the case for a re ‐connect, which will require empowering employees and managers to have more influence in takeover decisions and, in turn, dis empowering shareholders and financial intermediaries. The article thus highlights the regulatory space for takeovers and considers feasible policy options, a set of interlinked regulatory changes, which will in particular require a more assertive state.