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A Quiet Revolution in Corporate Governance: An Examination of Voluntary Best Practice Governance Policies
Author(s) -
Baulkaran Vishaal
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
international review of finance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.489
H-Index - 18
eISSN - 1468-2443
pISSN - 1369-412X
DOI - 10.1111/irfi.12017
Subject(s) - voting , corporate governance , accounting , stock exchange , business , enterprise value , turnover , sample (material) , economics , finance , political science , politics , management , law , chemistry , chromatography
This paper investigates the effects of several voluntary best practice corporate governance principles on firm performance and firm risk. Using a sample of Standard & Poor's/Toronto Stock Exchange Composite Index firms from 2003–2010, I show that firms with individual director election and detailed disclosure of voting results in director elections have a higher firm value or performance. Firms with independent chairman, majority voting, and detailed disclosure of voting results in director elections have lower idiosyncratic risk. In addition, the results from the panel regression show that detailed disclosure of voting results in director election leads to lower systematic and total risk.