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Rationality, strategic uncertainty, and belief diversity in non‐cooperative games
Author(s) -
Zambrano Eduardo
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
international journal of economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.351
H-Index - 11
eISSN - 1742-7363
pISSN - 1742-7355
DOI - 10.1111/ijet.12161
Subject(s) - ex ante , rationality , mathematical economics , economics , class (philosophy) , action (physics) , diversity (politics) , microeconomics , adversary , computer science , epistemology , philosophy , sociology , physics , computer security , quantum mechanics , anthropology , macroeconomics
Abstract I investigate the existence of epistemic models of complete information games that satisfy the following properties: players do not rule out their opponent's use of rational ex ante strategies for deriving their choices; they do not rule out, ex ante , that they can come to know the action profile that is ultimately played; and they do not rule out strategic uncertainty. In this paper I show that for a large class of games there are no epistemic models that satisfy these three properties.