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Social norms and cooperation
Author(s) -
McCan Bryan C.
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
international journal of economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.351
H-Index - 11
eISSN - 1742-7363
pISSN - 1742-7355
DOI - 10.1111/ijet.12160
Subject(s) - prisoner's dilemma , dilemma , sanctions , norm (philosophy) , preference , mathematical economics , repeated game , microeconomics , game theory , economics , social dilemma , superrationality , non cooperative game , political science , mathematics , geometry , law
A theoretical framework is introduced to model social norms using the tools of psychological game theory. In the prisoner's dilemma game, a preference for norm compliance can lead to cooperation arising with a positive probability, and if this preference is sufficiently strong, occurring as a pure strategy equilibrium. Thus, cooperation can arise as a social norm in a one‐shot prisoner's dilemma game without repeated play, communication, or sanctions.