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Some equivalence results for a bargaining set in finite economies
Author(s) -
HervésEstévez Javier,
MorenoGarcía Emma
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
international journal of economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.351
H-Index - 11
eISSN - 1742-7363
pISSN - 1742-7355
DOI - 10.1111/ijet.12149
Subject(s) - equivalence (formal languages) , economics , set (abstract data type) , mathematical economics , veto , finite set , coincidence , economy , mathematics , computer science , pure mathematics , medicine , mathematical analysis , alternative medicine , pathology , politics , political science , law , programming language
We present a bargaining set for finite economies using Aubin's ([Aubin, J. P., 1979]) veto and show its coincidence with the set of Walrasian allocations, providing a discrete approach to the characterization of competitive equilibria obtained by Mas‐Colell ([Mas‐Colell, A., 1989]) for continuum economies. We also study how the restriction on the formation of coalitions affects the bargaining set. In the last part of the work, using our equivalence result along with some known characterizations of Walrasian allocations, we state additional interpretations of the bargaining set.