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Bi‐cooperative network games: A link‐based allocation rule
Author(s) -
Borkotokey Surajit,
Gogoi Loyimee,
Mukherjee Diganta
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
international journal of economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.351
H-Index - 11
eISSN - 1742-7363
pISSN - 1742-7355
DOI - 10.1111/ijet.12148
Subject(s) - link (geometry) , mathematical economics , set (abstract data type) , class (philosophy) , position (finance) , value (mathematics) , computer science , microeconomics , non cooperative game , economics , game theory , computer network , artificial intelligence , finance , machine learning , programming language
We study the notion of a bi‐cooperative network game and obtain a link‐based allocation rule for the corresponding class. Unlike classical network games where players have single motive of forming (or not forming) a network, a player under a bi‐cooperative set up has two more variations: all her links attribute exclusively to her positive or negative contributions, or few links are positive while few others are negative. We extend the position value, an important link‐based allocation rule in classical network games, and show that it is the only rule for all the three variations of a bi‐cooperative network game.