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Monotonicity implications for the ranking of rules for airport problems
Author(s) -
Calvo Miguel Ángel Mirás,
Sandomingo Carmen Quinteiro,
Rodríguez Estela Sánchez
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
international journal of economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.351
H-Index - 11
eISSN - 1742-7363
pISSN - 1742-7355
DOI - 10.1111/ijet.12101
Subject(s) - ranking (information retrieval) , shapley value , monotonic function , axiom , mathematical economics , cooperative game theory , axiomatic system , subsidy , value (mathematics) , economics , mathematical optimization , computer science , microeconomics , mathematics , game theory , artificial intelligence , machine learning , market economy , mathematical analysis , geometry
The airport problem is a classic cost allocation problem that has been widely studied. Several rules have been proposed to divide the total cost among the agents, attending to the characteristics of the problem or via game theory. The axiomatic approach provides a way to choose among rules. Our main goal is to provide some tools to evaluate how rules differentially treat larger airlines as compared to smaller airlines. We use the Lorenz and no‐subsidy orderings to compare rules. We introduce some monotonicity and boundedness properties that imply a specific ranking with respect to the nucleolus and the Shapley value.