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Stable sets for asymmetric information economies
Author(s) -
Graziano Maria Gabriella,
Meo Claudia,
Yannelis Nicholas C.
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
international journal of economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.351
H-Index - 11
eISSN - 1742-7363
pISSN - 1742-7355
DOI - 10.1111/ijet.12057
Subject(s) - context (archaeology) , mathematical economics , economics , set (abstract data type) , exchange economy , von neumann architecture , pareto optimal , pareto principle , property (philosophy) , economy , microeconomics , mathematics , computer science , pure mathematics , operations management , paleontology , philosophy , biology , programming language , epistemology
An exchange economy with asymmetrically informed agents is considered with an exogenous rule that regulates the information sharing among agents. In this context, the notion of stable sets à la von Neumann and Morgenstern is analyzed. Two different frameworks are taken into account as regards preferences: a model without expectations and a model with expected utilities. For the former, it is shown that the set V of all individually rational, Pareto optimal, symmetric allocations is the unique stable set of symmetric allocations. For the latter, an example is presented which shows that the same set V is not externally stable and a weaker result is proved.