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A STRUCTURAL MODEL OF ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Author(s) -
Aruoba S. Borağan,
Drazen Allan,
Vlaicu Razvan
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
international economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.658
H-Index - 86
eISSN - 1468-2354
pISSN - 0020-6598
DOI - 10.1111/iere.12361
Subject(s) - accountability , incentive , agency (philosophy) , welfare , economics , perfect information , term (time) , order (exchange) , politics , selection (genetic algorithm) , public economics , imperfect , microeconomics , econometrics , political science , computer science , finance , market economy , philosophy , linguistics , physics , epistemology , quantum mechanics , artificial intelligence , law
This article proposes a structural approach to measuring the effects of electoral accountability. We estimate a political agency model with imperfect information in order to identify and quantify discipline and selection effects, using data on U.S. governors. We find that the possibility of reelection provides a significant incentive for incumbents to exert effort, that is, a disciplining effect. We also find a positive but weaker selection effect. According to our model, the widely used two‐term regime improves voter welfare by 4.2% compared to a one‐term regime, and better voter information about the effort of the governors would further increase voter welfare by up to 0.5%.
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