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PATENTABILITY, R&D DIRECTION, AND CUMULATIVE INNOVATION
Author(s) -
Chen Yongmin,
Pan Shiyuan,
Zhang Tianle
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
international economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.658
H-Index - 86
eISSN - 1468-2354
pISSN - 0020-6598
DOI - 10.1111/iere.12326
Subject(s) - patentability , incentive , economics , industrial organization , microeconomics , law , patent law , intellectual property , political science
We present a model where firms conduct R&D in both a safe and a risky direction. As patentability standards rise, an innovation in the risky direction is less likely to receive a patent, which decreases the static incentive for new entrants to conduct risky R&D but can increase their dynamic incentive. These, together with a strategic substitution and a market structure effect, result in an inverted‐U shape in the risky direction but a U shape in the safe direction for the relationship between R&D intensity and patentability standards. R&D is biased toward (against) the risky direction under lower (higher) standards.