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UNIVERSALISM AND THE VALUE OF POLITICAL POWER
Author(s) -
Koh Yumi
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
international economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.658
H-Index - 86
eISSN - 1468-2354
pISSN - 0020-6598
DOI - 10.1111/iere.12307
Subject(s) - legislature , universalism , economics , microeconomics , value (mathematics) , legislation , politics , power (physics) , capital (architecture) , point (geometry) , distributive property , bargaining power , public economics , law and economics , political science , computer science , law , physics , geometry , mathematics , archaeology , quantum mechanics , machine learning , pure mathematics , history
Although legislatures typically use majority rule to allocate a budget in distributive legislation, unanimous consent over the broad allocation of benefits is pervasive. I develop a game‐theoretic model where members strategically interact in a universal coalition to determine allocations, with noncooperative bargaining as a threat point for the breakdown of cooperation. To quantify the effects of political power on the agreed‐upon allocation, I structurally estimate the model using the “Bridge Bill Capital Budget” in 1992. I find that 16.73% of the budget would be allocated differently if allocations were determined only based on actual needs.