RUMORS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS | Zendy

Bloch Francis | Zendy; Demange Gabrielle | Zendy; Kranton Rachel | Zendy

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RUMORS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS

Author(s) -

Bloch Francis,

Demange Gabrielle,

Kranton Rachel

Publication year - 2018

Publication title -

international economic review

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 2.658

H-Index - 86

eISSN - 1468-2354

pISSN - 0020-6598

DOI - 10.1111/iere.12275

Subject(s) - incentive , limit (mathematics) , filter (signal processing) , computer science , bayesian game , microeconomics , state (computer science) , transmission (telecommunications) , incentive compatibility , bayesian probability , social network (sociolinguistics) , economics , game theory , mathematical economics , repeated game , artificial intelligence , telecommunications , mathematics , social media , algorithm , mathematical analysis , computer vision , world wide web

This article studies the transmission of rumors in social networks. We consider a model with biased and unbiased agents. Biased agents want to enforce a specific decision and unbiased agents to match the true state. One agent learns the true state and sends a message to her neighbors, who decide whether or not to transmit it further. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game, show that the social network can act as a filter, and that biased agents may have an incentive to limit their number.

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