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RUMORS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS
Author(s) -
Bloch Francis,
Demange Gabrielle,
Kranton Rachel
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
international economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.658
H-Index - 86
eISSN - 1468-2354
pISSN - 0020-6598
DOI - 10.1111/iere.12275
Subject(s) - incentive , limit (mathematics) , computer science , filter (signal processing) , bayesian game , incentive compatibility , microeconomics , state (computer science) , transmission (telecommunications) , bayesian probability , mathematical economics , repeated game , game theory , economics , artificial intelligence , telecommunications , mathematics , algorithm , mathematical analysis , computer vision
This article studies the transmission of rumors in social networks. We consider a model with biased and unbiased agents. Biased agents want to enforce a specific decision and unbiased agents to match the true state. One agent learns the true state and sends a message to her neighbors, who decide whether or not to transmit it further. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game, show that the social network can act as a filter, and that biased agents may have an incentive to limit their number.