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SOFT MONEY AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
Author(s) -
PASTINE IVAN,
PASTINE TUVANA
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
international economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.658
H-Index - 86
eISSN - 1468-2354
pISSN - 0020-6598
DOI - 10.1111/iere.12030
Subject(s) - campaign finance , supreme court , politics , special interest group , interest rate , law and economics , economics , monetary policy , monetary economics , political science , public economics , law
We analyze special interest influence on policy when political contributions are capped but the regulation contains soft‐money loopholes. The politician chooses between two policy options. We define special interest influence as the probability the politician chooses the policy he would not have chosen in the absence of contributions. Any binding cap reduces special interest influence but the effect may be nonmonotonic. A ban on contributions can result in greater special interest influence than a binding but nonzero cap. The results may also have implications for the policy response to the 2010 Supreme Court ruling on Citizens United v . FEC.