Premium
Divine Freedom and Free Will Defenses
Author(s) -
Franks W. Paul
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
the heythrop journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.127
H-Index - 10
eISSN - 1468-2265
pISSN - 0018-1196
DOI - 10.1111/heyj.12075
Subject(s) - argument (complex analysis) , order (exchange) , free will , epistemology , philosophy , law and economics , sociology , economics , chemistry , biochemistry , finance
This paper considers a problem that arises for free will defenses when considering the nature of G od's own will. If G od is perfectly good and performs praiseworthy actions, but is unable to do evil, then why must humans have the ability to do evil in order to perform such actions? This problem has been addressed by Theodore Guleserian, but at the expense of denying G od's essential goodness. I examine and critique his argument and provide a solution to the initial problem that does not require abandoning G od's essential goodness.