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The C hinese Paradox of High Growth and Low Quality of Government: The Cadre Organization Meets Max Weber
Author(s) -
Rothstein Bo
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
governance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.46
H-Index - 76
eISSN - 1468-0491
pISSN - 0952-1895
DOI - 10.1111/gove.12128
Subject(s) - bureaucracy , language change , government (linguistics) , doctrine , argument (complex analysis) , economics , administration (probate law) , quality (philosophy) , state (computer science) , rule of law , control (management) , law and economics , china , public administration , public economics , political science , law , management , politics , philosophy , linguistics , biochemistry , chemistry , epistemology , algorithm , computer science
Much research has argued for the importance of state's administrative capacity for development. Disregard for the rule of law and failure to get corruption under control are seen as detrimental to economic and social development. The China paradox refers to the fact that in all commonly used measures of levels of corruption and the quality of government, C hina is a country that scores quite low. C hina also lacks the W eberian model of bureaucracy that is seen as central for development. It is argued that this paradox is the result of disregarding the existence of a different public administration model in C hina—the cadre organization. Instead of rule following, this organization is marked by high commitment to a specific policy doctrine. The argument is that while very different from W eberian bureaucracy, this organization is well suited for effectively implementing policies for economic and social development.