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Economic Mobility and Fiscal Federalism: Taxation and European Responses in a Changing Constitutional Context
Author(s) -
Snell Jukka,
Jaakkola Jussi
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
european law journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.351
H-Index - 54
eISSN - 1468-0386
pISSN - 1351-5993
DOI - 10.1111/eulj.12212
Subject(s) - constitutionality , tax competition , legislature , solidarity , context (archaeology) , economics , european union , member state , direct tax , federalism , economic policy , european integration , state (computer science) , tax reform , law and economics , political science , public economics , indirect tax , law , member states , constitution , paleontology , politics , biology , algorithm , computer science
In this article we explore the claim that the four freedoms of the EU lead to the inevitable erosion of the capacity of Member States to collect tax, undermining national systems of welfare and solidarity. We argue that European tax integration has undergone a significant change during the last ten years or so, with a judicial, regulatory and legislative response by Union institutions. First, the Court of Justice has recalibrated some of the basic concepts it applies when reviewing the European constitutionality of national tax norms. Second, the Commission has utilised state aid rules to attack targeted tax competition. Third, important legislative initiatives have been adopted or proposed to safeguard Member State taxing capacities. The new phase is influenced by the changed constitutional context of the recent enlargements and the Eurozone crises, which may increase the supply of and demand for tax integration.