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Authoritarian Liberalism in the E uropean Constitutional Imagination: Second Time as Farce?
Author(s) -
Wilkinson Michael A.
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
european law journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.351
H-Index - 54
eISSN - 1468-0386
pISSN - 1351-5993
DOI - 10.1111/eulj.12133
Subject(s) - authoritarianism , liberalism , ideology , constitutionalism , democracy , political economy , politics , law , political science , classical liberalism , state (computer science) , law and economics , sociology , algorithm , computer science
The current crisis in Europe recalls the theory and practice of authoritarian liberalism, the idea that in order to protect economic liberalism and respect for fiscal discipline, representative democracy must be curtailed. This configuration was first identified by Hermann Heller in late Weimar as a response to the imperative to maintain the ideological separation of state and economy and presented by K arl P olanyi as conditioned by broader geo‐political pressure to maintain the gold standard in the inter‐war period. Authoritarian liberalism is now conditioned by conflicting imperatives to maintain the project of the single currency, respect ordo‐liberal concerns of moral hazard, and protect ‘militant democracy’ but only in one country. Does this reflect a broader geo‐political disequilibrium, due to tensions between market integration, constitutionalism and democracy?