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Rule‐Making by the E uropean F inancial S upervisory A uthorities: Walking a Tight Rope
Author(s) -
Busuioc Madalina
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
european law journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.351
H-Index - 54
eISSN - 1468-0386
pISSN - 1351-5993
DOI - 10.1111/eulj.12016
Subject(s) - credibility , agency (philosophy) , legitimacy , set (abstract data type) , law and economics , computer science , business , operations research , political science , economics , law , sociology , engineering , social science , politics , programming language
Abstract The new E uropean F inancial S upervisory A uthorities have received much attention in the literature, particularly due to their exceptional emergency decision‐making powers. By contrast, this article explicitly chooses to focus on these agencies' less explored yet equally crucial role: their (quasi‐)rule‐making responsibilities. While being less striking at first sight than their emergency counterparts, these rule‐making powers are considerable, carry significant consequences, and raise some interesting dilemmas and concerns. This article complements the previous contribution by going at a lower level of specification and zooming in on a crucial case for studying rule‐making by agencies as the A uthorities constitute a culmination of agency rule‐making powers, as well as agency powers, more broadly. The article will analyse the A uthorities' main (quasi‐)rule‐making powers and the relevant procedures. It will specifically investigate their role with respect to the adoption of regulatory and implementing technical standards, as well as guidelines and recommendations. The article also identifies and highlights a set of problematic issues that arise, threatening to jeopardise the legitimacy and credibility of their rule‐making.