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CEO influence on the board of directors: Evidence from corporate spinoffs
Author(s) -
Pham Duong T.
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
european financial management
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.311
H-Index - 64
eISSN - 1468-036X
pISSN - 1354-7798
DOI - 10.1111/eufm.12260
Subject(s) - chief executive officer , shareholder , business , accounting , compensation (psychology) , executive compensation , sample (material) , corporate governance , officer , management , finance , psychology , economics , political science , law , social psychology , chemistry , chromatography
We utilize a sample of spinoff firms that need to form a new board of directors, to shed light on the chief executive officer (CEO) influence hypothesis. We find spinoff boards with a CEO who was the parent firm CEO to be similarly structured to the boards of industry and size‐matched peers, whereas spinoff boards with nonparent CEOs are structured for greater monitoring. Consistent with our board structure results, the CEO compensation and replacement decisions of parent CEO spinoff boards are more lenient toward spinoff CEOs, whereas those of nonparent CEO spinoff boards are more consistent with protecting shareholder benefits.