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Multiple Large Shareholders and Corporate Risk‐taking: Evidence from French Family Firms
Author(s) -
Boubaker Sabri,
Nguyen Pascal,
Rouatbi Wael
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
european financial management
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.311
H-Index - 64
eISSN - 1468-036X
pISSN - 1354-7798
DOI - 10.1111/eufm.12086
Subject(s) - shareholder , corporate governance , voting , business , agency (philosophy) , agency cost , sample (material) , accounting , monetary economics , economics , finance , politics , philosophy , chemistry , epistemology , chromatography , political science , law
We investigate the role of multiple large shareholders (MLS) in corporate risk‐taking. Using a sample of publicly listed French family firms over the period 2003−2012, we show that the presence, number and voting power of MLS are associated with higher risk‐taking. Our results suggest that MLS help restrain the propensity of family owners to undertake low‐risk investments. This effect is much stronger in firms that are more susceptible to agency conflicts. The results highlight the important governance role played by MLS in family firms and may explain why MLS are associated with higher firm performance.