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Gödelian platonism and mathematical intuition
Author(s) -
Wrigley Wesley
Publication year - 2022
Publication title -
european journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.42
H-Index - 36
eISSN - 1468-0378
pISSN - 0966-8373
DOI - 10.1111/ejop.12671
Subject(s) - platonism , intuition , epistemology , philosophy , realism , interpretation (philosophy) , analytic philosophy , structuralism (philosophy of science) , contemporary philosophy , linguistics
Abstract This paper has two key aims. The first is to clarify the nature of Gödel's platonism. I offer an interpretation of Gödel's remarks on realism and intuition from which a clarified Gödelian position, called conceptual platonism , can be extracted. The second aim is to assess the philosophical merits of this theory. I defend it from charges of mysticism and theology, arguing instead that conceptual platonism is problematic for a more familiar reason. Given the familiarity of this problem, there are implications for a broad family of views in the philosophy of mathematics.