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Condillac on being human: Language and reflection reconsidered
Author(s) -
Waldow Anik
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
european journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.42
H-Index - 36
eISSN - 1468-0378
pISSN - 0966-8373
DOI - 10.1111/ejop.12599
Subject(s) - embodied cognition , epistemology , value (mathematics) , function (biology) , endowment , cognition , psychology , experiential learning , precondition , cognitive science , sociology , philosophy , computer science , neuroscience , mathematics education , evolutionary biology , machine learning , biology , programming language
In the Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge , Condillac argues that humans develop reason only once they have discovered the function of signs and the use of language in their encounters with others. Commentators like Hans Aarsleff and Charles Taylor believe that a precondition for this discovery is the presence of a special human capacity: the capacity to reflectively relate to what is given in experience. The problem with this claim is that it returns Condillac to a form of innatism from which he was keen to escape, because it assumes that human minds are reflective qua original endowment. I argue that Condillac attributed limited value to explanations based on the static analysis of innate natures and instead opted for a dynamic examination of developmental trajectories enabled through species‐specific embodied experiences. Through this dynamic approach, he was able to do two things at once: explain how it is possible that human cognition is of a unique superior kind, while at the same time defending the view that humans are like any other species in that they form species‐specific mental features through their experiential engagement with the contingent circumstances of life.