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The force and the content of judgment
Author(s) -
Rödl Sebastian
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
european journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.42
H-Index - 36
eISSN - 1468-0378
pISSN - 0966-8373
DOI - 10.1111/ejop.12541
Subject(s) - judgement , metaphysics , psychologism , epistemology , opposition (politics) , subject (documents) , content (measure theory) , philosophy , logical consequence , logical analysis , psychology , mathematics , computer science , law , political science , mathematical statistics , statistics , mathematical analysis , politics , library science
This essay explores what it means to reject Frege's distinction of force and content: the rejection completes Frege's anti‐psychologism as it leaves no space for a psychological concept of judgment distinct from the logical concept, which is the concern of no empirical science, but of logic. It emerges that logic, as the science of judgement, is — not a metaphysics of judgement, but — metaphysics. And it emerges that the opposition of subject to subject — the elementary nexus of thinker to thinker in dialogue — is contained within the logical concept of judgment.