Commitment and transformative choice

This paper presents a new solution to the problem of transformative choice raised by L.A. Paul's recent work. Paul thinks that transformative choices pose a problem because we cannot assess how much we would value the results of such choices due to the fact that we are unfamiliar with what the experiences that result will be like. I draw on Amartya Sen's notion of commitments and their place in our decision‐making for resources to address this problem. I argue that in many cases, such commitments give us all the grounds we need to assess the subjective value of a choice. This means that by drawing on commitments, we can rationally make transformative choices even if we do not know what the experience that results will be like. Moreover, unlike some proposed solutions to the problem posed by transformative choice, I think that my suggestion is compatible with the way Paul sets up the problem and does not rest on any sort of claim that her way of describing it is in mistaken in some way. In fact, I believe that in many ways, my proposal here builds on and takes further her own suggestion about how to solve the problem of transformative choice.