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Heidegger on Guilt: Reconstructing the Transcendental Argument in Being and Time
Author(s) -
Elgat Guy
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
european journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.42
H-Index - 36
eISSN - 1468-0378
pISSN - 0966-8373
DOI - 10.1111/ejop.12522
Subject(s) - ontic , transcendental number , argument (complex analysis) , philosophy , epistemology , conscience , psychoanalysis , psychology , chemistry , biochemistry
Abstract In the chapter on conscience and guilt in Being and Time , Heidegger makes transcendental claims to the effect that Dasein's Being‐guilty is the condition of possibility of factical guilt—guilt for specific misdeeds. In this article, I reconstruct Heidegger's transcendental argument. To do so, I distinguish factical guilt from (what I call) ontic guilt and ontological guilt and explain why Dasein's ontic guilt is a necessary condition of possibility of Dasein's factical guilt and why ontic guilt, in turn, is necessarily conditioned by Dasein's ontological guilt, or Dasein's ownmost Being‐guilty. In the process, I provide an interpretation of the two “nullities” that constitute Dasein's Being‐guilty according to Heidegger. I end the paper with thoughts on why Dasein's Being‐guilty is only a necessary yet not a sufficient condition of factical guilt in general and factical moral guilt in particular.