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Must naive realists be relationalists?
Author(s) -
Steenhagen Maarten
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
european journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.42
H-Index - 36
eISSN - 1468-0378
pISSN - 0966-8373
DOI - 10.1111/ejop.12462
Subject(s) - presentational and representational acting , mistake , perception , psychology , object (grammar) , subject (documents) , relation (database) , epistemology , direct and indirect realism , realism , cognitive psychology , social psychology , philosophy , aesthetics , computer science , linguistics , political science , law , database , library science
Relationalism maintains that perceptual experience involves, as part of its nature, a distinctive kind of conscious perceptual relation between a subject of experience and an object of experience. Together with the claim that perceptual experience is presentational, relationalism is widely believed to be a core aspect of the naive realist outlook on perception. This is a mistake. I argue that naive realism about perception can be upheld without a commitment to relationalism.
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