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Hume's distinction between impressions and ideas
Author(s) -
Rickless Samuel C.
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
european journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.42
H-Index - 36
eISSN - 1468-0378
pISSN - 0966-8373
DOI - 10.1111/ejop.12347
Subject(s) - realm , epistemology , perception , feeling , reflection (computer programming) , philosophy , simple (philosophy) , psychology , aesthetics , computer science , law , political science , programming language
An important part of Hume's philosophy is grounded in a fundamental distinction between two kinds of perceptions: impressions and ideas. Existing views of the distinction are that the former are livelier than the latter, that the former are causally prior to the latter, that the latter are copies of the former, that the former but not the latter are perceptions of an objective realm, and that the former are feelings whereas the latter are thoughts. I argue that all of these views of the distinction are problematic and should be replaced by the Reflection view, according to which (simple) ideas are, while impressions are not, the direct products of reflection on other perceptions.