Premium
Sense and the identity conception of truth
Author(s) -
Methven Steven J.
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
european journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.42
H-Index - 36
eISSN - 1468-0378
pISSN - 0966-8373
DOI - 10.1111/ejop.12334
Subject(s) - realm , identity (music) , epistemology , philosophy , logical truth , sociology , aesthetics , law , political science
The identity conception of truth holds that a thinkable is true just in case it is a fact. As such, it sets itself against correspondence theories of truth, while respecting the substantive role played by truth in respect of enquiry. In this article, I motivate and develop that view, and, in so doing, promote a particular conception of sense. This allows me to defend the view from two substantial criticisms. First, that the identity conception of truth is incoherent in respect of its treatment of objects in the realm of reference, and, second, that it is committed to a view of the world in which ordinary objects have no place.