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Cornell Realism, Explanation, and Natural Properties
Author(s) -
Oliveira Luis R.G.,
Perrine Timothy
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
european journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.42
H-Index - 36
eISSN - 1468-0378
pISSN - 0966-8373
DOI - 10.1111/ejop.12282
Subject(s) - naturalism , natural (archaeology) , realism , epistemology , scientific realism , philosophy , sociology , history , archaeology
The claim that ordinary ethical discourse is typically true and that ethical facts are typically knowable ( ethical conservativism ) seems in tension with the claim that ordinary ethical discourse is about features of reality friendly to a scientific worldview ( ethical naturalism ). Cornell Realism attempts to dispel this tension by claiming that ordinary ethical discourse is, in fact, discourse about the same kinds of things that scientific discourse is about: natural properties. We offer two novel arguments in reply. First, we identify a key assumption that we find unlikely to be true. Second, we identify two features of typical natural properties that ethical properties lack. We conclude that Cornell Realism falls short of dispelling the tension between ethical conservativism and ethical naturalism.