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How Transparent is Disgust?
Author(s) -
Contesi Filippo
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
european journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.42
H-Index - 36
eISSN - 1468-0378
pISSN - 0966-8373
DOI - 10.1111/ejop.12274
Subject(s) - disgust , transparency (behavior) , object (grammar) , psychology , representation (politics) , epistemology , cognitive science , cognitive psychology , aesthetics , social psychology , philosophy , computer science , artificial intelligence , political science , law , computer security , anger , politics
According to the so‐called transparency thesis, what is disgusting in nature cannot but be disgusting in art. This paper critically discusses the arguments that have been put forward in favour of the transparency thesis, starting with Korsmeyer's ([Korsmeyer, C., 2011]) sensory view of disgust. As an alternative, it offers an account of the relationship between disgust and representation that explains, at least in part, whatever truth there is in the transparency thesis. Such an account appeals to a distinction between object‐centric and situation‐centric emotions.