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The Double Intentionality of Emotional Experience
Author(s) -
Cochrane Tom
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
european journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.42
H-Index - 36
eISSN - 1468-0378
pISSN - 0966-8373
DOI - 10.1111/ejop.12233
Subject(s) - feeling , intentionality , psychology , content (measure theory) , emotion work , social psychology , cognitive psychology , epistemology , mathematical analysis , philosophy , mathematics
I argue that while the feeling of bodily responses is not necessary to emotion, these feelings contribute significant meaningful content to everyday emotional experience. Emotional bodily feelings represent a ‘state of self’, analysed as a sense of one's body affording certain patterns of interaction with the environment. Recognising that there are two sources of intentional content in everyday emotional experience allows us to reconcile the diverging intuitions that people have about emotional states, and to understand better the long‐standing debate between bodily feeling‐based and appraisal‐based theories of emotion.