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Kant on Impenetrability, Touch, and the Causal Content of Perception
Author(s) -
Marshall Colin
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
european journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.42
H-Index - 36
eISSN - 1468-0378
pISSN - 0966-8373
DOI - 10.1111/ejop.12223
Subject(s) - commit , perception , content (measure theory) , philosophy , epistemology , philosophy of mind , a priori and a posteriori , psychology , philosophy of language , metaphysics , computer science , mathematics , mathematical analysis , database
It is well known that Kant claims that causal judgments, including judgments about forces, must have an a priori basis. It is less well known that Kant claims that we can perceive the repulsive force of bodies (their impenetrability) through the sense of touch. Together, these claims present an interpretive puzzle, since they appear to commit Kant to both affirming and denying that we can have perceptions of force. My first aim is to show that both sides of the puzzle have deep roots in Kant's philosophy. My second aim is to present three potential solutions to the puzzle and show that each faces problems.