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Believing In Twin Earth: New Evidence for the Normativity of Belief
Author(s) -
Kalantari Seyed Ali,
Miller Alexander
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
european journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.42
H-Index - 36
eISSN - 1468-0378
pISSN - 0966-8373
DOI - 10.1111/ejop.12211
Subject(s) - doxastic logic , epistemology , argument (complex analysis) , philosophy , normative , natural (archaeology) , geography , chemistry , biochemistry , archaeology
According to many philosophers, the notion of belief is constitutively normative (Boghossian ([Boghossian, P., 2003], [Boghossian, P., 2005]); Shah ([Shah, N., 2003], [Shah, N., 2006]); Shah and Velleman ([Shah, N., 2005]); Gibbard ([Gibbard, A., 2005]); Wedgwood ([Wedgwood, R., 2002], [Wedgwood, R., 2007])). In a series of widely discussed papers ([Horgan, T., 1990], [Horgan, T., 1992a], [Horgan, T., 1992b]), Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have developed an ingenious ‘Moral Twin Earth’ argument against ‘Cornell Realist’ metaethical views which hold that moral terms have synthetic natural definitions in the manner of natural kind terms. In this paper we shall suggest that an adaptation of the Moral Twin Earth argument to the doxastic case – Doxastic Twin Earth – provides new evidence for the normativity of belief.