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An Agency‐Based Capability Theory of Justice
Author(s) -
Claassen Rutger
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
european journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.42
H-Index - 36
eISSN - 1468-0378
pISSN - 0966-8373
DOI - 10.1111/ejop.12195
Subject(s) - capability approach , agency (philosophy) , social justice , economic justice , field (mathematics) , sociology , set (abstract data type) , object (grammar) , epistemology , process (computing) , computer science , law and economics , political science , law , artificial intelligence , philosophy , social science , mathematics , pure mathematics , programming language , operating system
The capability approach is one of the main contenders in the field of theorizing social justice. Each citizen is entitled to a set of basic capabilities. But which are these? Martha Nussbaum formulated a set of ten central capabilities. Amartya Sen argued they should be selected in a process of public reasoning. Critics object that the Nussbaum‐approach is too perfectionist and the Sen‐approach is too proceduralist. This paper presents a third alternative: a substantive but non‐perfectionist capability theory of justice. It presents a two‐level concept of individual agency as connected to social practices. It then argues basic capabilities are those necessary to for the agency necessary to navigate freely and autonomously between different social practices.