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Whistling in 1929: R amsey and W ittgenstein on the Infinite
Author(s) -
Methven S. J.
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
european journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.42
H-Index - 36
eISSN - 1468-0378
pISSN - 0966-8373
DOI - 10.1111/ejop.12089
Subject(s) - interpretation (philosophy) , legend , philosophy , epigraph , epistemology , extant taxon , intuitionism , criticism , literature , linguistics , art , evolutionary biology , biology
Cora D iamond has recently criticised as mere legend the interpretation of a quip of R amsey's, contained in the epigraph below, which takes him to be objecting to or rejecting W ittgenstein's Tractarian distinction between saying and showing. Whilst I agree with D iamond's discussion of the legend, I argue that her interpretation of the quip has little evidential support, and runs foul of a criticism sometimes made against intuitionism. Rather than seeing R amsey as making a claim about the nature of propositions, as D iamond does, we should understand him as making a claim about the grammar of the logical connectives. Such a view coheres with the extant evidence of the nature of W ittgenstein's and R amsey's 1929 philosophical encounters. It is also compatible with attributing to Ramsey a recognition of Wittgenstein's distinction and with denying that criticising it is the lesson of the quip.